



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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OCFAS/CJG

CY# 281

# National Intelligence Daily

*Saturday*  
*19 March 1983*

~~Top Secret~~

CPAS NID 83-066JX

19 March 1983

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25X1

**Page Denied**

**Top Secret**

25X1

## **Contents**

---

<b>El Salvador:</b> [redacted] .....	1
<b>Lebanon:</b> Attacks on the Multinational Force .....	2
<b>USSR-Western Europe:</b> Views on CSCE .....	3
<b>Turkey:</b> Parties Law To Be Enacted .....	4

25X1

25X1

<b>Bulgaria:</b> Internal Security Changes .....	7
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25X1

## **Special Analyses**

<b>USSR-Yugoslavia:</b> Tikhonov's Visit .....	10
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25X1

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25X1

19 March 1983

**Top Secret**

25X1

**EL SALVADOR:**

25X1

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Meanwhile, the government's recently formed peace commission has indicated to US officials that the draft amnesty law would be ready for the Assembly's approval next week. The law would give the guerrillas 40 days to surrender to peace commission offices, rather than to military installations. The offices would be established in each of the country's 14 departments

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The peace commission is intended to undercut calls by the insurgents for negotiations leading to power sharing. It apparently hopes its offer of security guarantees will bring some of the more moderate elements in the insurgent alliance into the electoral process, thereby undermining the guerrillas' unity and damaging their prestige at home and abroad.

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**LEBANON: Attacks on the Multinational Force**

*The four attacks this week on the multinational peacekeeping force in the Beirut area could be the work of one or more groups seeking to discredit the capabilities of the force and hasten its departure.* [redacted]

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All the incidents took place in predominantly Shia areas. The principal Shia religious leaders, however, have condemned the attacks and have expressed their support for the role of the multinational force. [redacted]

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[redacted] representatives of Lebanon's two Communist parties met with other Lebanese leftists last December. The purpose of the meeting was to plan attacks against both the multinational force and the Lebanese Army. [redacted]

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**Comment:** The Communists and the radical Shias oppose the central government and could view attacks on the multinational force as a way to weaken the force's commitment to Lebanon and to discredit the government's security forces. Iranian relations with radical Shia elements appear strong, and [redacted] Iranian activity in Lebanon could be related to the attacks on the multinational force. [redacted]

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It is also possible that Syria has sponsored the attacks. Damascus may fear the role of the multinational force will be expanded in areas that would limit the role of Lebanese forces supported by Syria. [redacted]

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**USSR-WESTERN EUROPE: Views on CSCE**

*The Soviets almost certainly will support the compromise draft final CSCE agreement submitted by the neutral and nonaligned participants as a basis for further negotiations, but the West Europeans are divided over how to proceed.* [ ]

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At a meeting of Western Ambassadors at the CSCE almost all of the Allies welcomed the neutrals' draft as the basis for final negotiations. The Dutch and British representatives, however, voiced disappointment with the weakness of the proposed provision on human rights. British officials have hinted that they may prefer to end the meeting in Madrid early if the human rights sections are not strengthened. [ ]

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**Comment:** The Soviets would welcome an early agreement in Madrid in order to put the US on the defensive. Although the revised language imposes more strictly defined limits on a European disarmament conference than Moscow wants, the USSR probably would accept the noncommittal references to human rights. Barring an early agreement, the Soviets would prefer to keep the talks going out of concern that their breakdown would reduce the chances of blocking NATO INF deployments in the fall. [ ]

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The Allies do not want the West blamed by public opinion for failure at Madrid, because it might hurt prospects for INF deployment. EC leaders are to discuss CSCE strategy next week, and they almost certainly will favor continued negotiations on the neutrals' draft. If conservative elements in Chancellor Kohl's new government prevail on this issue, the West Germans may join the British in supporting strengthened human rights provisions. [ ]

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**TURKEY: Parties Law To Be Enacted**

*The ruling generals will promulgate a new political parties law in a few days, but they may postpone the parliamentary election scheduled for this fall in order to give the new parties time to organize and campaign.* [ ]

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Political circles are uncertain whether the generals will permit resumption of political activity after the law is enacted or wait until promulgation of the electoral law, perhaps as early as mid-April. Political leaders are urging the generals either to allow parties to start organizing after the parties law is in place or to postpone the parliamentary election—now set for October—until the spring of 1984. They want to ensure that the new parties have enough time to organize, choose leaders, nominate candidates, and conduct campaigns. [ ]

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The chairman of the Consultative Assembly's constitutional committee, which drafted the parties bill and is now writing the electoral law, has publicly hinted the election might be delayed. [ ]

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**Comment:** Sticking to the current timetable would open the generals to charges of stifling political activity. Postponing the election, however, would tend to confirm the doubts of their West European critics, who have been skeptical of the generals' intention to restore civilian rule this year. The ruling council so far has met all of its self-imposed deadlines, but the generals' determination to reestablish democracy on a sound footing could persuade them to delay the election until the spring of 1984. [ ]

25X1

**Top Secret**

19 March 1983

25X1

**Page Denied**

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied



**Top Secret**

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**BULGARIA: Internal Security Changes**

The US Embassy in Sofia reports party leader Zhivkov has replaced a deputy interior minister and the director of the national police and is forcing retirements of many other senior security officials. Zhivkov has named party officials to the top posts and has ordered them to crack down on corruption. Rumors indicate major scandals may be brewing, including the alleged murder of a judge who was investigating diversions of military equipment during the Warsaw Pact exercise last September. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** The shakeup comes at a time when Sofia is defending itself against allegations of complicity in the attempted assassination of the Pope and international drug smuggling. As a result, it is likely to prompt more foreign speculation of a Bulgarian coverup. Zhivkov, however, may believe he has to tighten his control to assure that no further embarrassments occur. [REDACTED]

25X1

**Top Secret**

19 March 1983

25X1

**Page Denied**

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied

**Top Secret**

25X1

## **Special Analysis**

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### **USSR-YUGOSLAVIA: Tikhonov's Visit**

*Premier Tikhonov, who arrives in Belgrade on Monday, is the most important Soviet visitor to Yugoslavia since Tito's death in May 1980. Tikhonov and his delegation probably hope to assess the ability of Yugoslav leaders to deal with the country's economic and political difficulties and will seek an endorsement of the USSR's arms control proposals. The Yugoslavs are likely to ask the Soviets to sell them more oil and probe the attitudes of the new leadership in Moscow toward their government.* [ ]

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The USSR's agreement to proceed with the frequently postponed visit affirms Moscow's general satisfaction with the current state of bilateral relations. The Yugoslavs almost certainly will seek Soviet reaffirmation of past agreements—particularly the Belgrade declaration of 1955, under which the USSR recognized Yugoslavia's independent course. [ ]

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### **Economic Questions**

The talks are likely to focus primarily on trade issues. Yugoslavia's deteriorating economy is forcing it to expand exports to the West and consider putting greater emphasis on market forces at home. Nevertheless, Soviet trade in 1982 accounted for 34 percent of Yugoslavia's exports and 20 percent of its imports. [ ]

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Trade between the two countries is conducted through a bilateral clearing account that allows the Yugoslavs to pay for Soviet oil with goods that might not sell in convertible currency markets. Yugoslavia lacks hard currency to increase purchases of non-Soviet oil, and it is likely to urge the USSR to sell it more oil and natural gas at current low world prices. The Soviets, however, are unlikely to increase their deliveries without a substantial increase in the quality of Yugoslav exports to the USSR. [ ]

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Tikhonov may question the Yugoslavs about the West's financial assistance package for Yugoslavia. He probably will argue that, despite this help, Yugoslavia's long-term economic interests still require close relations with the "socialist" countries. [ ]

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The Premier is likely to warn the Yugoslavs against any political conditions attached to Western assistance. The Yugoslavs probably will respond by reassuring the Soviets that Western aid does not carry

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compromising economic or political conditions and by asking for more aid from the USSR. [ ]

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Moscow has made some effort to help Yugoslavia. Last year the Yugoslavs persuaded the Soviets to deliver some raw materials early but failed to obtain an increase in the overall volume of deliveries for the year. There were hard feelings in Belgrade, however, about the USSR's attempts to secure better quality Yugoslav goods in exchange. [ ]

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The annual trade protocol, which was signed in January, included concessions permitting Belgrade to run a trade deficit in 1983. Although the protocol indicates a more forthcoming Soviet policy, the Yugoslavs will remain skeptical as Moscow sometimes has failed to honor its promises. [ ]

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### **The Press**

Tikhonov is likely to restate Moscow's longstanding complaint about anti-Soviet material in the Yugoslav media and cultural life. A recent article in a Zagreb weekly implying that Stalinism still exists in the USSR could be a sore point. [ ]

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Last week the Yugoslav party's Central Committee plenum itself implied the need for tighter party control over "irresponsible" journalists, a move the Soviets almost certainly approve. Few speakers, however, advocated punitive action, and currently there appears to be no general crackdown on the press. [ ]

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### **Foreign Policy Issues**

Differences over the recent Nonaligned Summit in New Delhi also may be contentious. Tikhonov may complain about Belgrade's opposition to the Cuban-inspired formula that the "socialist" states are the "natural allies" of the nonaligned countries. He probably will also object to Yugoslav President Stambolic's implicit criticism in New Delhi of the USSR's policy toward Afghanistan and Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea. [ ]

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Yugoslavia and the USSR are closer on regional security questions. Tikhonov may get general endorsement of the Soviet INF initiatives announced at the Warsaw Pact summit in January. Authoritative Yugoslav commentaries have been favorable toward General Secretary Andropov's proposal and skeptical that the US is sincere about INF arms control. Belgrade agrees with Moscow that INF deployment by NATO would raise tensions. [ ]

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The Yugoslavs may seek Soviet approval of the latest draft by the neutral and nonaligned countries of the CSCE concluding document, formally introduced by a Yugoslav speaker at the meeting in Madrid last week. They are likely to point out that the draft softens Western language on human rights and calls for a post-Madrid disarmament meeting, the USSR's primary goal in the CSCE proceedings.

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25X1

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Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied

**Top Secret**

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